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Explanation and Misrepresentation in the Laboratory 
 
 
Abstract 
 We report the results of an experiment designed to examine the effect of 
opportunity to provide an explanation for inaccurate results and predictability of behavior 
on managers’ reporting bias and investors’ ability to decipher the bias.  We conduct 20 
experimental sessions, each comprised of one manager and three or four investors.  The 
manager has an incentive, in general, to inflate investors’ expectations and investors have 
an incentive to accurately predict value.  We find that the manager reports with an 
upward bias a majority of the time.  The magnitude of the bias, however, is lessened 
considerably when the manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable and the manager 
has an opportunity to explain inaccurate (biased) reports.  The data suggest that under 
such conditions the manager seeks to avoid reporting inaccurately and having to choose 
an explanation.  We also find that investors adapt to the manager’s behavior and, 
strikingly, anticipate that explanation dampens reporting bias.  
 
 
Keywords: reporting bias, misrepresentation, explanation, investor behavior, earnings 
reports, negative emotion
Explanation and Misrepresentation in the Laboratory 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to examine managers’ 
reporting behavior and investors’ reaction to such behavior.  Research has long 
recognized that managers have incentives to report strategically, the purpose being to 
shape users’ beliefs of firm performance (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001).  In such cases, 
managers may not fully reveal private information and earnings reports may be biased.1  
Although the accuracy of earnings reports is typically revealed ex post (eventually), the 
cause for inaccuracies may be unknown: that is, inaccurate or biased reports may be 
attributable to managers’ opportunistic behavior, to circumstances beyond the managers’ 
control, or to a combination of the two. 
In the face of bad news, managers may disclose an explanation for performance 
shortcomings to alleviate users’ concern (e.g., Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw, 
McKechnie, and Puffer, 1983; Barton and Mercer, 2004).  Extant research suggests that 
larger companies and companies in less regulated industries are more likely to augment 
earnings forecasts with an explanation, particularly for poor forecasts (Baginski, Hassell, 
and Kimbrough, 2004).  Based on firm characteristics and reporting history, users may 
come to expect an explanation for sub-par performance in some cases and not others.  We 
experimentally investigate whether the opportunity to provide an explanation (allow 
versus not allow) affects managers’ behavior in a multi-period setting.  The manipulation 
permits us to create an environment in which an explanation is expected (allowed) versus 
                                                 
1 Earnings reports are defined broadly and include earnings forecasts and earnings announcements.  In 
either case, the manager has private information as to future realizations – be it information on the 
production function or on the appropriateness of accruals. 
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not expected (not allowed).  We contend that if an explanation is expected for deviations 
in performance, under certain conditions managers are subject to other behavioral 
influences, which affect reporting behavior.  
A growing literature documents the importance of social preferences in 
understanding individual behavior (e.g., Fehr, Fischbacher, and Kosfeld, 2005; Sobel, 
2005).  Some people are fairness-minded and many are prone to honesty regardless of the 
situation (Hannan, Rankin, and Towry, 2006).  Although others have preferences that are 
best modeled based purely on self-interest, even self-interested people want to minimize 
emotional discomfort (e.g., Elster, 1998; Dana, Cain, and Dawes, 2006).  Under certain 
conditions, a manager who potentially has to explain an inaccurate report may be less 
prone to bias because the manager wishes to subsequently avoid feelings of guilt, shame, 
regret, or other negative emotion (Scheff, 1988; 2003; Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre, 
2002; Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh, 2005; Connolly and Butler, 2006).  Managers may be 
less willing to bias earnings reports when they may have to explain their decisions and 
are concerned about what investors think of them. 
In their experimental examination of internal reporting, Hannan, Rankin, and 
Towry (2006) conclude that a manager’s behavior is affected by the trade-off between the 
benefits of honesty and those of misrepresentation.  In their definition, the reports of 
honest managers accurately reflect private information.  Honesty benefits a manager 
because it generates the trust of others and the positive feeling of self-esteem.  At the 
same time, misrepresentation may increase a manager’s income.  Hannan, Rankin, and 
Towry find that their experimental managers want to appear honest.  Other research also 
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suggests that managers are concerned with the appearance of honesty (Young, 1985; 
Stevens, 2002).  
A critical element of the reporting environment that impacts managers’ behavior 
is the nature of underlying incentives: more specifically, whether knowledge of 
underlying incentives enables investors to predict managers’ reporting bias.  Practically 
speaking, investors have some insight into managers’ incentives because proxy 
statements provide details of executive compensation plans, including base salary, cash 
bonuses, stock options granted, options exercised, and value realized.  But, compensation 
packages, including relationships between pay and performance, are often rather opaque 
(Bebchuk, 2006a; 2006b).  Furthermore, the link between underlying incentives and the 
predictability of managers’ behavior can vary dramatically.  Executive compensation 
plans exhibit wide cross-section variation, which implies differences across companies in 
the pay-performance relation (e.g., Kole, 1997; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Stathopoulos, 
Espenlaud, and Walker, 2004).2  The structure of the compensation plan, thus, determines 
the link between pay and earnings reports, which sheds light into the predictability of 
managers’ reporting behavior.   
For our purposes, we vary managers’ incentive scheme such that compensation is 
indirectly linked to earnings reports in one treatment and directly linked in another.  
Managers’ behavior is less predictable in the former and more predictable in the latter.3  
We experimentally investigate whether the predictability of managers’ behavior affects 
                                                 
2 In addition, the level of detail included in compensation disclosures can differ considerably, which affects 
investors’ knowledge of the underlying incentives and, in turn, ability to infer reporting behavior (e.g., 
Coulton, James, and Taylor, 2004; Muslu, 2005).   
3 Stock options that can be exercised over a period of time provide an example of an incentive mechanism 
that corresponds to the unpredictable treatment.  A cash bonus tied to annual earnings, on the other hand, 
provides an example of an incentive mechanism that corresponds to the predictable treatment. 
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reporting bias and, in turn, investors’ ability to adapt to such behavior.  As discussed 
subsequently, we argue that if managers’ actions are not predictable, the opportunity to 
provide an explanation for deviations in performance lessens managers’ reporting bias in 
an effort to avoid negative emotions.  By comparison, if the managers’ actions are 
predictable, the effect of explanation on managers’ behavior is weakened.  In this case, 
explanation does not deter managers’ reporting bias because investors expect 
performance deviations.   
We find that the manager reports with an upward bias a majority of the time.  The 
magnitude of the bias, however, is lessened considerably when the manager’s reporting 
behavior is unpredictable and the manager has an opportunity to explain inaccurate 
(biased) reports.  Under such conditions, the manager appears to avoid reporting 
inaccurately and having to choose an explanation.  We also find that investors adapt to 
the manager’s behavior and anticipate that explanation dampens reporting bias. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we develop a 
framework and provide testable hypotheses.  In section 3, we describe the experimental 
procedures and, in section 4, present the results.  Lastly, we offer concluding remarks, 
provide implications for practice, and make suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Framework 
2.1 Experiment Overview 
We conduct 20 experimental sessions.  Each session consists of five rounds and 
each round lasts four periods.  Each session includes a manager and three or four 
investors.  At the beginning of each period, the manager privately observes a signal of the 
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forecasted outcome for the period.  The manager then chooses an outcome to report to 
investors.  Upon receiving the manager’s report, each investor predicts an outcome for 
the period.  The manager’s compensation, in general, is positively associated with his or 
her ability to inflate investors’ predictions.  By comparison, investors’ experimental 
earnings are positively associated with the accuracy of their predictions.  Furthermore, 
each party’s incentive is common knowledge: that is, the manager knows how investors 
generate experimental earnings and vice versa. 
We manipulate the manager’s opportunity to explain inaccurate reports (allow 
versus not allow an explanation) and the predictability of the manager’s reporting 
behavior (predictable versus unpredictable) via the manager’s incentive scheme.  For 
predictability, we vary the link between the manager’s period-by-period compensation 
and reported outcome.  We conduct five sessions for each experimental group.   
 
2.2 Participants 
We recruit 93 students from a large Canadian university to participate in the 
experiment.  We conduct 20 sessions with four or five participants per session.4  
Participants have a mean age of 21.43 years.  All participants are in at least their third 
year of university studies in business, with the vast majority concentrating in accounting 
or finance.  Students earn, on average, $43.42 (Canadian dollars) for participating 90 to 
105 minutes. 
 
                                                 
4 All sessions have one manager.  Seven sessions have three investors and 13 have four investors. 
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2.3 Procedures 
Prior to administering the experimental sessions, participants are assigned a role 
(manager or investor) and told where to report.  Logistically the manager arrives at one 
location and investors at another.  An experimenter distributes the instructions and reads 
them aloud.  The instructions are the same, regardless of the participant’s role, except that 
the manager receives additional information on the forecasted outcome (discussed 
below). 
 Participants are informed that the realized outcome per period is generated from a 
normal distribution with a mean of 200 and a standard deviation of 50.  The instructions 
state that the probability the realized outcome is between 150 and 250 is 68.3 percent and 
the probability it is between 100 and 300 is 95.5 percent. 
 At the beginning of each period, the manager receives a forecast of the firm’s 
outcome.5  The realized outcome (R), announced at period end, equals the forecasted 
outcome (F) plus a random error term (e).  The error term is generated from a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 20.  The manager is informed 
of the specifics of the distribution and receives forecasted and realized outcomes from ten 
practice trials.  Because the error term is mean zero and normally distributed, the 
forecasted outcome represents the manager’s unbiased estimate of the outcome for the 
period.  Investors know the manager has private information on the specifics of the error 
term, but nothing more. 
                                                 
5 The experimental instructions do not use the terms manager and investor.  Rather, participants are referred 
to as sender and predictor.  We use generic language to avoid potential confounds introduced by 
terminology. 
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 After receiving the forecast, the manager reports an outcome (S).6  The reported 
amount cannot exceed ±20 of the forecasted outcome.7  The experimenter takes the 
manager’s report to the room in which the investors are located and announces the 
reported outcome.  The investors then individually predict the outcome (P) for the period.  
After all have recorded their prediction, the experimenter determines the median 
predicted outcome (PM) and announces it publicly.  In addition, the manager is informed 
of the realized outcome for the period.  Investors are not informed of the realized 
outcome until round end. 
 The investors have an incentive to predict the outcome accurately.  Investors’ 
experimental earnings per period (Inv) are computed as follows.8 
 Inv = constant − │P − R│, 
bounded at zero from below.  Hence, earnings increase as the absolute prediction error 
approaches zero.   
 The manager, on the other hand, has an incentive to inflate investors’ expectations 
of the outcome.  We manipulate when it is advantageous for the manager to do so.  In the 
predictable treatment, the manager’s compensation per period (Mgr) is computed as 
follows. 
 Mgr = fixed wage + (PM – F), 
                                                 
6 An important feature of our experiment is that the manager is an active participant, which means that 
reports are determined endogenously.  In previous studies, the manager’s reporting behavior is often 
imposed exogenously.  Because we allow the manager to be an active participant, we are able to observe 
reporting behavior over time in a dynamic setting: that is, the extent that private information is reflected in 
the reported outcome and whether reporting behavior changes over time 
7 Investors are informed of this constraint: i.e., that the managers’ reported outcome is bounded by ±20 of 
the forecasted outcome.  We chose ±20 because it is 10 percent of the mean of the outcome distribution 
and, under generally accepted accounting principles, amounts in excess of 10 percent are generally 
considered to be material (i.e., not permissible). 
8 Note that investors cannot compute their experimental earnings until round end: i.e., not until the realized 
outcome per period is revealed. 
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bounded at zero from below.  In this case, the manager has an incentive to inflate 
investors’ expectations each period: that is, to the greatest extent possible over the course 
of a round.   
In the unpredictable treatment, the manager’s compensation is based on only one 
period per round, specified by the manager.  Using the specified period, the manager’s 
compensation is computed as follows. 
Mgr = 4 x [fixed wage + (PM – F)]. 
The other three periods in the round do not affect compensation.  In this case, the 
manager has an incentive to inflate investor’s expectations one of four periods.  In terms 
of procedure, the manager is informed of the investors’ median prediction of the outcome 
at period end.  The manager then elects whether to choose the current period to determine 
compensation.  The manager may defer to a future period, but cannot return to a previous 
one.  Once a period is chosen, it is announced to investors at the beginning of the next 
period.9    
 The procedures for each period within a round are similar.  At the end of a round, 
the manager is provided the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports in one treatment but 
not the other.  Inaccurate reports are defined as those that produce a difference between 
the reported and realized outcome, cumulated over a round, of at least 20.10  If the 
cumulative difference for the round exceeds ±20, the manager may offer an explanation.  
The manager chooses from the following: apologizes for inaccurate reports, attributes 
inaccurate reports to circumstances beyond control (denies blame), or remains silent 
                                                 
9 As mentioned earlier, the manager and investors’ incentive schemes are common knowledge. 
10 The difference per period is signed such that a difference of +10 in one period is cancelled by −10 in 
another.  This approach is consistent with the reversing nature of accruals. 
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(states that an explanation is not being provided).11  By including the three options, we 
allow the manager to choose from the feasible set of explanations.  The manager’s choice 
is recorded and then announced to investors. 
 Each experimental session proceeds for five rounds or 20 periods.  The number of 
rounds is not announced beforehand, but participants are informed that a session will not 
last longer than 120 minutes.  At the conclusion of the fifth round, participants complete 
a post-experiment questionnaire designed to collect demographics and elicit information 
about the experiment, including assessments of the manager’s reporting behavior.  
Subsequently participants are paid and dismissed.12 
 
3. Framework 
 We develop a framework to consider the interactive effect of opportunity to 
explain inaccurate reports and the predictability of behavior on the manager’s reporting 
bias and investors’ ability to decipher such bias.  The research hypotheses are developed 
in the context of the experimental setting.  To aid the reader, we summarize the 
experimental procedures and parameters in Table 1. 
 Our setting is one in which the manager is motivated to inflate investors’ 
expectations (for at least one of four periods), which can prompt the manager to 
misrepresent private information and report with bias.  Prior research indicates that 
                                                 
11 Research in psychology is mixed concerning the most effective response.  Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, and 
Murnighan (2006) suggest that an apology can mitigate punishment.  But the apology can backfire if it is 
perceived as manipulative or insincere (Skarlicki, Folger, and Gee, 2004).  Denial also can be effective in 
preserving one’s standing with others, but as mentioned earlier it must be plausible (e.g., Kaplan and 
Reckers, 1993; Sigal, Hsu, Foodim, and Betman, 1988; Barton and Mercer, 2004).  Remaining silent may 
be preferable if the other explanations cannot be conveyed credibly over time.  It is beyond the scope of the 
current study to empirically examine what type of explanation is most effective.  But we are able to collect 
data on the frequency that each type of explanation is chosen, which may facilitate future research. 
12 Experimental earnings are converted to cash using a conversion rate known to participants at the 
beginning of the experiment. 
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misrepresentation occurs in this type of setting, particularly with information asymmetry 
or an unknown other (e.g., O’Connor and Carnevale, 1997; Schweitzer and Croson, 1999; 
Boles, Croson, and Murnighan, 2000). 
 
3.1 Explanation and Reporting Behavior 
 We consider whether the opportunity to provide an explanation for inaccurate 
reports mitigates managers’ willingness to misrepresent private information, the effect 
being to lessen reporting bias.  Dickhaut and McCabe (1997) contend that the act of 
recording information and making it public can affect managers’ behavior.  In our 
treatment with explanation, if reporting inaccuracies occur the manager must choose and 
record a message that is conveyed to investors.  The message may include an explanation 
for reporting inaccuracies (i.e., an apology or denial of blame) or it may state that an 
explanation is not being sent.  The act of choosing and recording the message may cause 
the manager to empathize with investors and to reflect on self.  Researchers have long 
recognized that individuals’ actions are affected by their beliefs about how others 
interpret actions, which Cooley (1922) referred to as the looking-glass self.  Individual 
behavior can be affected even when social interactions are anonymous (e.g., Forsythe, 
Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994; Dana, Cain, and Dawes, 2006).13 
 In our treatment with explanation, the necessity to choose and record a message 
represents a public statement that is most likely to occur when the manager misrepresents 
                                                 
13 An example includes experiments in which participants are asked to make a binding choice on splitting a 
sum of money with another, anonymous participant (i.e., dictator games).  The evidence indicates that 
participants give their paired recipient more than might be expected with fully selfish preferences because 
they do not want to be perceived as selfish, even though the decision is anonymous (refer to Davis and 
Holt, 1993). 
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private information and reports with bias.14  The manager likely perceives that such 
behavior (i.e., sending a required message) is evaluated negatively by investors.  In this 
case, the manager’s self monitoring in relation to others (investors) can give rise to guilt, 
shame, regret, or other negative emotions (Cooley, 1922; Goffman, 1967; Scheff, 1988; 
Williams, 1993; Dana, Cain, and Dawes, 2006).  The anticipation of a negative emotion, 
even at a subconscious level, can influence behavior (e.g., Scheff, 1988; Posner and 
Rasmusen, 1999; Barr, 2001; Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre, 2002).  Reflecting on 
self, under such conditions, results in psychological discomfort and individuals prefer to 
avoid such behavior (Thibodeau and Aronson, 1992; Stone and Cooper, 2001; Scheff, 
1988; 1997; Larrick, 1993; Williams, 1993; Barr, 2001; Smith, Webster, Parrott, and 
Eyre, 2002).  Accordingly, the manager prefers to avoid choosing an explanation, all else 
equal, and reacts by reporting with less bias when an explanation is allowed. 
 A competing factor that affects the managers’ reporting bias, and interacts with 
the effect of explanation, is the predictability of the manager’s behavior.  We manipulate 
the predictability of reporting behavior between experimental sessions via the manager’s 
compensation scheme.  In half the sessions, the manager has an incentive to inflate 
investors’ expectations each and every period, referred to as the predictable treatment.  In 
the other half, the manager has an incentive to inflate investors’ expectations in at least 
one of four periods, referred to as the unpredictable treatment.  
 
                                                 
14 As noted previously (in the description of the experimental procedures), the manager knows that his or 
her private information is an unbiased estimate of the realized outcome.   
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3.2 Predictable Reporting Behavior  
 According to game theory, in the predictable treatment the manager biases the 
reported outcome upward each period by the maximum allowable amount: S = F + 20 
(refer to Table 1).  But investors are not disadvantaged by such behavior.  Rather they 
anticipate the manager’s reporting bias and discount the reported outcome downward 
each period: P = S – 20.  Thus, the manager is unable to inflate investors’ expectations, 
investors are not hurt by the manager’s actions, and investors thus are unlikely to have ill 
feelings toward the manager.15  When reporting bias is predictable, the potential for 
negative emotion is suppressed and the manager’s reporting behavior is unlikely to be 
affected by the opportunity to provide an explanation.  Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore 
(2005) suggest that when conflicts of interest are honestly disclosed, making incentives 
transparent and behavior predictable, individuals feel morally licensed and strategically 
encouraged to exaggerate reporting bias.  In this case, potential feelings of negative 
emotions, associated with misrepresentations, are reduced.  Likewise, Rankin, Schwartz, 
and Young (2006) suggest that misrepresentation occurs in strategic settings in which 
such behavior is expected and predictable.  Therefore, the manager is expected to bias the 
reported outcome upward in the predictable treatment, regardless of whether explanation 
is allowed.  We posit the following, using the superscript M to denote the managers’ 
reporting behavior. 
H1M: If reporting behavior is predictable, the manager reports with an upward 
bias.   
 
H2M: If reporting behavior is predictable, the manager’s reporting bias is not 
affected by explanation. 
                                                 
15 Recall that the manager’s compensation increases as the difference between the median predicted 
outcome and the forecasted outcome (PM – F) increases.  The investors’ compensation, on the other hand, 
increases as the difference between the predicted and realized outcome (P – R) decreases. 
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 Investors react to the manager’s reporting behavior over the course of an 
experimental session.  As time progresses and realized outcomes are revealed at the end 
of each round, investors gain insight into the manager’s behavior, discerning how to 
anticipate and adjust for reporting bias.  Dynamic models of learning suggest that 
individuals adjust to factors that reinforce successful outcomes (e.g., Camerer and Ho, 
1999; Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt, 1999; Goeree and Holt, 2004).  In essence, 
investors adapt to situational factors in determining predicted outcomes each round.  
When the manager’s reporting behavior is predictable, investors’ discount the reported 
outcome and the adjustment is not affected by explanation.  We provide the following, 
using the superscript I to denote the investors’ reaction to the reported outcome.   
H1I: If reporting behavior is predictable, investors adjust the reported outcome 
downward.   
 
 H2I: If reporting behavior is predictable, investors’ adjustment of the reported 
outcome is not affected by explanation. 
 
3.3 Unpredictable Reporting Behavior 
 When the manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable, the setting is more 
complex.  Backward induction implies that the manager biases the reported outcome 
upward in the first period by the maximum allowable amount (S = F + 20).  Such 
behavior occurs because nothing can be gained from deferring the choice.16  For periods 
2 – 4, the manager reports without bias (S = F).  Investors’ anticipate such behavior and 
react accordingly.  In other words, the reported outcome is discounted by the maximum 
allowable amount in the first period (P = S – 20) and taken at face value in periods 2 – 4 
                                                 
16 Because investors are not informed of the realized outcome per period until round end, they discount the 
reported outcome by the maximum allowable amount until the manager chooses a period to determine 
compensation.  Accordingly, the manager is indifferent between choosing the first period or a later period 
to determine compensation.   
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(P = S).  Although game theory prescribes equilibrium play, it is unlikely to explain 
behavior in the unpredictable treatment.  Foremost, backward induction fails to explain 
behavior in the laboratory and significant off-equilibrium behavior typically is observed 
(e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996; Johnson, Camerer, 
Sen, and Rymon, 2002; Binmore, McCarthy, Ponti, Samuelson, and Shaked, 2002).   
 The unpredictable treatment produces much greater uncertainty for investors 
(compared to the predictable treatment) – specifically in discerning the manager’s 
reporting bias on a period-by-period basis.  In this case, the investors are disadvantaged 
relative to the manager and both parties recognize that the manager has the upper hand.  
The necessity to provide an explanation for inaccurate reports evokes negative emotions 
because it publicly signifies that the manager has exploited his or her position – solely for 
personal gain at the expense of others (i.e., the investors).  As such, the opportunity to 
explain inaccurate reports likely affects the manager’s reporting behavior.   
Recall that in the unpredictable treatment, the manager selects one of four periods 
to determine earnings for the round, referred to as the compensation period.  The manager 
decides at period end whether to select the current period or defer to a future period.  The 
manager has an incentive to inflate investors’ expectations prior to choosing the 
compensation period.  Once the period is chosen and announced, the incentive 
disappears.  But when explanation is allowed, another incentive arises.  The manager 
prefers to avoid providing an explanation for inaccurate reports due to anticipated 
negative emotions.  In this case, subsequent reports are aimed at offsetting upward bias 
reported in earlier periods (i.e., prior to selecting the compensation period).  The 
manager’s subsequent reports in essence expunge the upward bias reported earlier.  
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Therefore, when the manager’s behavior is unpredictable, explanation likely impacts 
reporting behavior after the compensation period is selected, but not before.  The 
preceding discussion suggests the following hypotheses. 
H3M: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, the manager reports with an upward 
bias before the compensation period is chosen.   
 
H4M: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, the manager’s reporting bias before 
the compensation period is chosen is not affected by explanation. 
 
H5M: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, the manager is more likely to report 
with a downward bias after the compensation period is chosen when explanation 
is allowed than not allowed.  
 
 We also provide hypotheses for the investors’ reaction that mirror those for the 
managers’ reporting behavior.  Investors presumably adapt over time and recognize that 
reporting bias differs before and after the compensation period is chosen.  Investors also 
come to realize that the reported outcome must be adjusted upward after the 
compensation period is chosen when explanation is allowed.  The hypotheses are as 
follows.  
H3I: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, investors adjust the reported outcome 
downward before the compensation period is chosen. 
 
H4I: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, investors’ adjustment of the reported 
outcome before the compensation period is chosen is not affected by explanation. 
 
H5I: If reporting behavior is unpredictable, investors are more likely to adjust the 
reported outcome upward after the compensation period is chosen when 
explanation is allowed than not allowed.  
 
4. Results 
 We examine the effect of explanation and the predictability of behavior on the 
manager’s reporting behavior and investors’ reaction.  We focus on two aspects: (1) the 
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difference between reported and forecasted outcome (S – F), which reflects the 
manager’s reporting bias, and (2) the difference between reported outcome and investors’ 
median prediction (S – PM), which reflects investors’ adjustment.  Initially, we examine 
the manager’s reporting bias, which enables us to assess H1M – H5M.  Then we turn to 
investors’ adjustment, which enables us to assess H1I – H5I.  In each case, we report 
descriptive findings followed by formal statistical tests. 
 
4.1 Manager’s Reporting Behavior 
 4.1.1. Descriptive Findings. The manager has an incentive to inflate investors’ 
expectations.  We examine the frequency that the manager reports with an upward bias (S 
> F), partitioning the data by experimental group.  When behavior is predictable, the 
manager reports with an upward bias over 80 percent of the time and explanation does 
not appear to affect behavior (refer to Panel A of Figure 1), consistent with H1M and 
H2M, respectively.   
 When behavior is unpredictable, explanation looks to reduce the frequency that 
the manager reports with an upward bias.  We partition the data by whether the 
compensation period has been chosen, which is of primary interest.17  Recall that the 
manager has an incentive to bias the reported outcome upward before the period is 
chosen, regardless of whether explanation is allowed (refer to H3M and H4M).  By 
                                                 
17 As mentioned earlier, game theory suggests the manager will choose the first period to determine 
compensation.  But the data are not consistent with this conjecture: the frequency that the first period is 
chosen is only 28 percent (14 of 50).  When explanation is allowed, the manager chooses period 1, 2, 3, or 
4 with a frequency of ten, five, six, and four, respectively.  When explanation is not allowed, the 
frequencies are four, five, ten, and six, respectively.  A chi-square test suggests that explanation is 
associated with the manager’s decision to choose the first period as the compensation period (χ2 = 3.571, p 
= 0.059, two-tailed test). 
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comparison, the manager is more inclined to bias the reported outcome downward bias 
after the period is chosen when explanation is allowed than not allowed (H5M). 
 The data indicate that before the compensation period is chosen, the manager 
reports with an upward bias roughly 75 percent of the time (refer to Panel B of Figure 1), 
which is consistent with H3M.  In this case, explanation does not seem to affect reporting 
behavior, as suggested by H4M.  Once the compensation period is chosen, though, 
explanation looks to impact reporting behavior.  The frequency of reports with upward 
bias is considerably less when explanation is allowed as opposed to not allowed (36 
percent versus 71 percent).  Additional inspection of the data indicates that after the 
compensation period is chosen, the manager reports with a downward bias 58 percent of 
the time when explanation is allowed versus 24 percent when it is not allowed, which is 
supportive of H5M.18 
4.1.2. Statistical Analysis. We perform a linear mixed model analysis, using 
maximum likelihood estimation (see Greene, 1997, Ch. 14).  The approach expands the 
general linear model by allowing the data to exhibit correlated and non-constant 
variability.19  The independent variables include the predictability of reporting behavior 
(predictable versus unpredictable), the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports (allow 
versus do not allow), and the interaction effect.  The dependent variable is the manager’s 
                                                 
18 We also examine the type of explanation selected when one is required.  When reporting behavior is 
predictable, the manager chooses denial eight times, apology twice, and remains silent five times.  When 
reporting behavior is unpredictable, the manager chooses denial five times, apology three times, and 
remains silent once.  The manager’s preference for denial is consistent with archival evidence (e.g., 
Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw, McKechnie, and Puffer, 1983). 
19 We investigate whether reporting bias exhibits autocorrelation or heterogeneity of variance.  We find an 
association between reporting bias in adjacent periods: the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at p 
< 0.03 for periods 2 and 3 and periods 3 and 4.  We also find evidence of heterogeneity of variance: Box’s 
test rejects the null hypothesis of equality of covariance matrices across groups at p = 0.001.  Accordingly, 
we use an AR(1) covariance structure with heteroskedasticity in the mixed model analysis.  The results 
reported in the paper, though, are robust to other specifications. 
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reporting bias per period (S – F), repeated over four periods per round and five rounds 
per session (i.e., period and round are included as repeated measures).20 
 Table 2 presents the results of the mixed model analysis.  The first hypothesis 
(H1M) suggests that the manager reports with an upward bias when behavior is 
predictable.  The positive estimated marginal means (in excess of 11.0) are consistent 
with H1M.  Furthermore, we find that when behavior is predictable, the reporting bias is 
positive in 163 of 200 periods (81.5 percent).  We also cumulate the reporting bias over 
the course of a round (i.e., over the four periods in a round) and find that the sum is 
positive in 45 of 50 rounds (90 percent).  Binomial tests confirm that the manager reports 
with an upward bias a majority of the time (p < 0.001). 
 The second and fifth hypotheses (H2M and H5M) suggest that the effect of 
explanation is contingent on the predictability of reporting behavior.  The significant 
interaction effect (p < 0.01), as illustrated in Panel B of Table 2, provides evidence of the 
contingent relationship.  Planned comparisons indicate that when the manager’s behavior 
is predictable, explanation does not affect reporting behavior, consistent with H2M.  By 
comparison, when behavior is unpredictable, explanation has a significant effect on 
reporting behavior (p < 0.01), consistent with H5M. 
 We further we assess the manager’s reporting behavior in the unpredictable 
treatment.  The third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses suggest differences before and after the 
compensation period is chosen.  For each session, we compute the manager’s reporting 
bias before the compensation period is selected as well as afterward.  Because different 
periods are chosen across rounds, we compute the average reporting bias per period 
                                                 
20 Inferences are unaffected if we use an ex post measure of reporting bias: that is, the difference between 
reported and realized outcome (S – R).  
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within a round (before and after).  For rounds in which the manager selects the last 
period, we only compute the reporting bias before the compensation period is chosen – 
there are not any periods afterward.21   
 The third and fourth hypotheses are concerned with reporting behavior prior to the 
compensation period being chosen.  In this case, the manager is expected to report with 
an upward bias (H3M) and explanation is not expected to affect reporting behavior (H4M).  
To assess the hypotheses, we perform a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).  The dependent measure is the average reporting bias per period within a 
round – before the compensation period is chosen.  The independent variables include 
explanation (allow versus not allow), round (one through five), and the interaction term.  
The ANOVA results, shown in Panel A of Table 3, indicate that the intercept is 
significant at p < 0.001.  The average reporting bias is 7.22, 12.96, 15.60, 11.21, and 
13.82 for rounds 1 – 5, respectively.  Hence, the manager reports with an upward bias, on 
average, prior to choosing the compensation period, which is consistent with H3M.  The 
insignificant main effect for explanation (p = 0.878) is consistent with H4M. 
The fifth hypothesis is concerned with reporting behavior after the compensation 
period is chosen.  In this case, explanation is expected to affect reporting behavior: the 
manager is more likely to report with a downward bias when explanation is allowed than 
not allowed (H5M).  The data provide 40 observations (rounds) in which we can compute 
the average reporting bias after the compensation period is chosen: 21 when explanation 
is allowed and 19 when not allowed.  We find that the mean (median) reporting bias per 
period within a round is −5.62 (−4.00) when explanation is allowed and 4.25 (4.00) when 
                                                 
21 The last period is selected ten times: four times when explanation is allowed and six times when it is not 
allowed. 
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not allowed.  Parametric and nonparametric tests indicate that the difference is 
statistically significant at p < 0.01, one-tailed test (t = 2.68 and z = −2.63, respectively).  
We also investigate the frequency that the average reporting bias is negative, which is 
indicative of the manager reporting with a downward bias after the compensation period 
is chosen.  As shown in Panel B of Table 3, the manager is more likely to report with a 
downward bias when explanation is allowed than not allowed: 67 percent versus 21 
percent (χ2 = 8.39, p = 0.004).  Thus, the findings are consistent with H5M. 
Lastly, to gain additional insight into the manager’s behavior, we examine the 
responses to the post-experiment questionnaire.  The manager is asked to characterize 
reporting behavior on three ten-point scales, with endpoints labeled misleading/truthful, 
selfish/altruistic, and unjust/fair.  We perform three two-way analyses of variance to test 
for differences between the experimental cells.  In all three cases, the interaction effect 
(predictability by explanation) is statistically significant at p ≤ 0.055.22  When the 
manager’s behavior is unpredictable and explanation is allowed, reporting behavior is 
characterized as being more truthful (mean of 6.6), more altruistic (mean of 6.2) and 
fairer (mean of 7.0) as compared to the other experimental cells.23  Thus, the combination 
of unpredictable behavior and allowing explanation affects the manager’s perception of 
his or her reporting behavior – and perceptions appear to be reflective of actual behavior. 
 
4.2. Investors’ Reaction 
 4.2.1. Descriptive Findings. Investors are aware of the manager’s incentive to 
inflate their expectations and, thus, are likely to respond by adjusting the reported 
                                                 
22 The findings are striking because only 20 managers participated in the experiment (i.e., five per 
experimental cell).  
23 For the other three cells, the mean response on each scale is at least 1.8 less.     
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outcome downward.  We examine the frequency that the median predicted outcome is 
less than the reported outcome (PM < S), partitioning the data by experimental group.  
When the manager’s reporting behavior is predictable, the median adjustment is 
downward about 60 percent of the time, providing weak support for H1I (refer to Panel A 
of Figure 3).  Moreover, explanation appears to have little affect on the frequency of 
investors’ downward adjustment (59 percent when explanation is allowed versus 62 
percent when not allowed), which is consistent with H2I. 
When the manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable, explanation has a 
slightly more pronounced effect on investors’ reaction.  We partition the data by whether 
the compensation period has been chosen, which is expected to affect investors’ reaction.  
Specifically, explanation is expected to affect investors’ adjustment after the 
compensation period is chosen, but not before.  The data indicate that before the period is 
chosen, the median adjustment is downward roughly 71 percent of the time and 
explanation does not appear to affect the frequency of downward adjustment, consistent 
with H3I and H4I, respectively.  After the compensation period is chosen, however, 
investors’ adjustment differs noticeably.  The frequency of downward adjustment 
declines and explanation looks to have a marked effect on behavior: the frequency of 
downward adjustment is 41 percent when explanation is allowed versus 59 percent when 
not allowed.  Further analysis indicates that after the compensation period is chosen, 
investors are more likely to adjust upward when explanation is allowed than not allowed 
(56 percent versus 42 percent when not allowed), consistent with H5I. 
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 4.2.2. Statistical Analysis. Once again we perform a linear mixed model analysis, 
using maximum likelihood estimation (Greene, 1997, Ch. 14).24  The independent 
variables include the predictability of behavior (predictable versus unpredictable), the 
opportunity to explain inaccurate reports (allow versus do not allow), and the interaction 
effect.  The dependent variable is the investors’ reaction per period (PM – S), repeated 
over four periods per round and five rounds per session (i.e., period and round are 
included as repeated measures). 
 Table 4 presents the results of the mixed model analysis.  The first and second 
hypotheses suggest that when behavior is predictable, investors adjust the reported 
outcome downward and explanation does not affect investors’ reaction.  The negative 
estimated marginal means (−2.5 and −5.5) are consistent with H1I.  In addition, we find 
that when the manager’s reporting behavior is predictable, investors’ adjustment is 
negative in 121 of 200 periods (60.5 percent).  We also cumulate investors’ adjustment 
over the course of a round (i.e., over the four periods in a round) and find that the sum is 
negative in 36 of 50 rounds (72 percent).  Binomial tests confirm that investors adjust the 
reported outcome downward a majority of the time (p < 0.01). 
The significant effect for explanation (p = 0.055), along with the insignificant 
interaction effect, is not consistent with H2I.  The estimated marginal mean for investors’ 
adjustment is −2.12 when explanation is allowed and −4.67 when not allowed.  The 
findings suggest that explanation dampens investors’ adjustment, regardless of the 
                                                 
24 As before, we examine whether investors’ reaction to the reported outcome exhibits autocorrelation or 
heterogeneity of variance.  We find some evidence of autocorrelation: the Pearson correlation coefficient is 
significant at p < 0.10 for periods 2 and 3 and periods 3 and 4.  Heterogeneity of variance, however, does 
not appear to be a problem: Box’s test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of equality of covariance 
matrices across groups (p > 0.50).  Thus, we use an AR(1) covariance structure in the mixed model 
analysis.  The results reported in the paper, though, are robust to other specifications. 
 23
predictability of the manager’s behavior.  Investors appear to anticipate less reporting 
bias when the manager has the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports than otherwise.   
To investigate the third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses, we focus on investors’ 
reaction when the manager’s behavior is unpredictable.  For each session, we compute 
investors’ adjustment before and after the compensation period is chosen.  Before the 
compensation period is chosen, investors are expected to adjust the reported outcome 
downward (H3I) and explanation is not expected to affect the adjustment (H4I).  After the 
compensation period is chosen, explanation is expected to affect investors’ adjustment:  
investors are more likely to adjust the reported outcome upward when explanation is 
allowed than not allowed (H5I).   
To assess H3I and H4I, we perform a repeated measures ANOVA.  The dependent 
measure is the average investor adjustment per period within a round – before the 
compensation period is chosen.  The independent variables include explanation (allow 
versus not allow), round (one through five), and the interaction term.  The ANOVA 
results, shown in Panel A of Table 5, indicate that the intercept is significant at p < 0.001.  
The average investors’ adjustment is −2.60, −4.67, −4.92, −9.00, and −3.83 for rounds 1 
– 5, respectively.  The findings indicate that investors adjust the reported outcome 
downward, on average, before the compensation period is chosen, which is consistent 
with H3I.  The insignificant main effect for explanation (p = 0.951) is consistent with 
H4I. 
To assess H5I, we examine investors’ reaction after the compensation period is 
chosen, testing for differences between the explanation treatments.  We find that the 
mean (median) adjustment per period within a round is 5.44 (6.67) when explanation is 
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allowed and −0.21 (2.00) when not allowed.  We conduct parametric and nonparametric 
tests and find some evidence that the adjustment is greater (and positive) when 
explanation is allowed than not allowed: t = −1.92, p = 0.031, one-tailed, and z = −1.56, p 
= 0.061, one-tailed.  Looking at the frequency of positive adjustment on a round-by-
round basis, we find that the adjustment is positive a majority of the time (refer to Panel 
B of Table 5).  Moreover, the frequency is slightly higher when explanation is allowed 
than not allowed (71 percent versus 59 percent), though the difference is not statistically 
significant (χ2 = 0.80, p = 0.370).  Overall, the findings suggest that explanation has a 
modest effect on the magnitude of investors’ adjustment after the compensation period is 
chosen, though it does not affect the direction of the adjustment.  Accordingly, the results 
are not entirely supportive of H5I.25 
Finally, we examine investors’ responses to the post-experiment questionnaire.  
Investors are asked to indicate the usefulness of the reported outcome (not useful at 
all/very useful) and to characterize the manager’s reporting behavior (misleading/truthful, 
selfish/altruistic, and unjust/fair).  Investors respond on various ten-point scales.  We 
perform four two-way analyses of variances to test for differences between the 
experimental groups.   
For usefulness, we find that explanation has a significant effect at p = 0.077.  
Investors respond that the reported outcome is more useful when explanation is allowed 
than not allowed (means of 6.6. versus 5.6).  For reporting behavior, the interaction effect 
is significant at p ≤ 0.045 in all cases.  Investors respond that the manager’s reporting 
                                                 
25 A factor that may contribute to our findings for investor reaction is that investors do not observe the 
outcome realization on a period-by-period basis (as does the manager).  Rather, the outcome realizations 
are observed at round end.  Hence, investors are not aware of reporting bias until round end, which makes 
the task much more difficult. 
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behavior is more truthful (mean of 5.8), more altruistic (mean of 6.0) and fairer (mean of 
6.3) when the manager behavior is unpredictable and explanation is allowed as compared 
to the other experimental groups.  These findings are similar to those reported earlier for 
the manager. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper reports the results of a dynamic, multi-period experiment designed to 
examine manager’s reporting behavior and investors’ reaction.  We conduct 20 
experimental sessions, with each session consisting of five rounds and each round lasting 
four periods.  The manager has an incentive, in general, to inflate investors’ expectations: 
that is, to report with upward bias.  Investors, on the other hand, have an incentive to 
accurately predict value.  We manipulate two variables between experimental sessions: 
the predictability of the manager’s reporting behavior and the manager’s opportunity to 
provide an explanation for inaccurate reports.   
We find that the manager reports with an upward bias a majority of the time, as 
may be expected.  The magnitude of the bias, however, is lessened considerably when the 
manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable and the manager has an opportunity to 
explain inaccurate (biased) reports.  The data suggest that, under such conditions, the 
manager seeks to avoid reporting inaccurately and having to choose an explanation.  The 
managers’ behavior in our experiment is consistent with a desire to avoid negative 
emotion. 
Our results provide strong support for indicated behavioral outcomes because we 
report results of decision-making in an abstract setting.  In naturally occurring 
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environments the effect of negative emotions should be even stronger as they are 
generated through direct experience. 
Importantly, our findings suggest that a non-strategic factor, explanation, 
significantly affects behavior.  A challenge for analytical researchers is to incorporate 
non-strategic factors, such as explanation, into models of reporting behavior.  In a related 
study, Kandel and Lazear (1992) consider how peer pressure affects incentives in an 
organizational setting, including aspects of shame and guilt in the model.  A similar 
approach may be useful in modeling reporting behavior.  We also encourage future 
research to investigate other factors that may underlie the anticipation of negative 
emotions and, in turn, attenuate the manager’s incentive to issue biased reports.   
Our findings also suggest that investors adapt to the manager’s reporting 
behavior, to some extent, and anticipate that explanation dampens reporting bias.  
Interestingly, other experimental research indicates that explanation can affect users’ 
assessments in a one-shot setting.  Barton and Mercer (2004) find that financial analysts 
are more optimistic about a company’s future prospects when a plausible explanation is 
offered for sub-par performance (attributing poor performance to external factors) than 
not offered.  Our findings suggest that simply creating the expectation that an explanation 
will be provided for deviations in performance – revealed in a multi-period setting – is 
enough to affect investors’ reaction to the manager’s report.  When explanation is 
allowed and expected, investors are more inclined to take the manager’s report at face 
value (i.e., investors’ adjustment is dampened).  Such behavior is adaptive when the 
manager’s reporting behavior is unpredictable, because in this case reporting bias is 
reduced and deviations in performance are less likely to occur.  When the manager’s 
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reporting behavior is predictable, however, investors’ reaction seems unfounded: in this 
case explanation does not diminish reporting bias nor does it affect the occurrence of 
deviations in performance.   
An implication of our findings is that the structure of compensation schemes (i.e., 
the pay-performance link) and the transparency of compensation disclosures are crucial 
for investors to consider in light of a manager’s explanation for sub-par performance.  
We encourage archival researchers to investigate explanation along with other facets of 
executive compensation to determine how investors’ welfare is affected.  Such research 
may be of particular interest to regulators. 
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Figure 1 
Manager’s Reporting Behavior 
 
Panel A: Upward Reporting Bias – All Experimental Groups 
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Panel B: Upward Reporting Bias – Only Groups with Unpredictable Behavior 
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 Notes: Predictable and unpredictable refer to the predictability of the manager’s 
reporting behavior.  Allow explanation and do not allow explanation refers to whether the 
manager has the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports.  Periods before and after are 
based on when the manager chooses a period to determine compensation with 
unpredictable behavior: that is, before or after the compensation period is chosen and 
announced. 
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Figure 2 
Investors’ Reaction 
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Panel B: Downward Adjustment –Only Cells with Unpredictable Behavior 
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Notes: Predictable and unpredictable refer to the predictability of the manager’s reporting 
behavior.  Allow explanation and do not allow explanation refers to whether the manager 
has the opportunity to explain inaccurate reports.  Periods before and after are based on 
when the manager chooses a period to determine compensation with unpredictable 
behavior: that is, before or after the compensation period is chosen and announced.   
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 Table 1 
Experimental Setting 
 
Panel A: Experimental Procedures 
 
Beginning of experimental session 
1. All participants are informed of the distribution used to generate the realized outcome. 
2. The manager is endowed with information on the distribution of the error term (e) used 
to generate the forecasted outcome. 
 
Each period 
1. The manager observes the forecasted outcome (F). 
2. The manager chooses the reported outcome (S). 
3. The investors observe the reported outcome and individually predict the outcome (P). 
4. The manager is informed of the realized outcome (R). 
5. The manager and investors are informed of the median predicted outcome (PM). 
6. For the unpredictable treatment, the manager decides whether to choose the current 
period to determine compensation.  Once a period is chosen, it is announced to the 
investors. 
 
End of round 
1. The investors are informed of the realized outcome for the four periods. 
2. If an explanation is allowed, the manager chooses an explanation when reporting 
inaccuracies, cumulated over the course of a round, exceed a threshold. 
3. The manager and investors compute their experimental earnings. 
 
Panel B: Experimental Parameters 
 
Manager’s compensation per period (Mgr) 
   Predictable Treatment Mgr = 15 + (PM − F), bounded below at 0 
   Unpredictable Treatment Mgr = 4 x [15 + (PM − F)] or 0, where the 
  manager chooses one period to determine 
 compensation for the round 
Investor’s compensation per period (Inv) Inv = 35 – |P – R|, bounded below at 0 
Realized outcome N(200,50) 
Forecasted outcome F = R + e 
Error term associated with forecast e ∼ N(0,20) 
Manager’s reporting threshold F − 20 ≤ S ≤ F + 20 
Threshold for providing an explanation ∑
=
>−
4
1
20)(
t
RS  or∑
=
−<−
4
1
20)(
t
RS  
 
 
 31
Table 2 
Manager’s Reporting Behavior: All Experimental Groups 
 
Panel A: Mixed Model Analysis Results 
 
Source F-statistic P-value 
Intercept 175.10 0.000 
Predictability 8.03 0.005 
Explanation 10.21 0.002 
Interaction 7.36 0.008 
 
Panel B: Estimated Marginal Means 
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Notes: The mixed model analysis assumes an AR(1) covariance structure with 
heteroskedasticity for the random effects, though the results are robust to other 
specifications.  Predictability refers to the predictability of the manager’s reporting 
behavior (predictable versus unpredictable).  Explanation refers to whether the manager 
has an opportunity to explain inaccurate reports (allow versus do not allow). 
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Table 3 
Manager’s Reporting Behavior: Unpredictable Treatment 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measures ANOVA Results Before the Compensation Period is Chosen 
 
Within-Subject Effects F-statistic P-value 
Round 1.77 0.159 
Round x Explanation 0.57 0.687 
Between-Subject Effects   
Intercept 82.35 0.000 
Explanation 0.03 0.878 
 
Panel B: Frequency of Downward Bias After the Compensation Period is Chosen 
 
Reporting Bias 
Explanation Downward 
(Bias < 0) 
Otherwise 
(Bias ≥ 0) 
Not Allowed 4 15 
Allowed 14 7 
Chi-Square Test χ2 = 8.39, p = 0.004 
 
Notes: The dependent measure in the repeated measures ANOVA is the average reporting 
bias per period within a round, computed using periods before the compensation period is 
chosen.  Round refers to the round in the experimental session (one through five).  
Explanation refers to whether the manager has an opportunity to explain inaccurate 
reports (allow versus do not allow).     
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Table 4 
Investors’ Reaction: All Experimental Groups 
 
Panel A: Mixed Model Analysis Results 
 
Source F-statistic P-value 
Intercept 26.58 0.000 
Predictability 0.84 0.361 
Explanation 3.76 0.055 
Interaction 0.91 0.764 
 
Panel B: Estimated Marginal Means 
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Notes: The mixed model analysis assumes an AR(1) covariance structure for the random 
effects, though the results are robust to other specifications.  Predictability refers to the 
predictability of the manager’s reporting behavior (predictable versus unpredictable).  
Explanation refers to whether the manager has an opportunity to explain inaccurate 
reports (allow versus do not allow). 
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Table 5 
Investors’ Reaction: Unpredictable Treatment 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measures ANOVA Before the Compensation Period is Chosen 
 
Within-Subject Effects F-statistic P-value 
Round 1.64 0.189 
Round x Explanation 0.17 0.951 
Between-Subject Effects   
Intercept 14.37 0.005 
Explanation 0.00 0.951 
 
Panel B: Frequency of Upward Adjustment After the Compensation Period is Chosen 
 
Investors’ Adjustment 
Explanation Upward 
(Bias > 0) 
Otherwise 
(Bias ≤ 0) 
Not Allowed 11 8 
Allowed 15 6 
Chi-Square Test χ2 = 0.80, p = 0.370 
 
Notes: The dependent measure in the repeated measures ANOVA is the average 
investors’ adjustment per period within a round, computed using periods before the 
compensation period is chosen.  Round refers to the round in the experimental session 
(one through five).  Explanation refers to whether the manager has an opportunity to 
explain inaccurate reports (allow versus do not allow).     
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